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We study the long-run relation between money, measured by inﬂation or
interest rates, and unemployment. We ﬁrst discuss data, documenting a
strong positive relation between the variables at low frequencies. We then
develop a framework where both money and unemployment are modeled
using explicit microfoundations, integrating and extending recent work in
macro and monetary economics, and providing a uniﬁed theory to analyze
labor and goods markets. We calibrate the model, to ask how monetary
factors account quantitatively for low-frequency labor market behavior.
The answer depends on two key parameters: the elasticity of money de-
mand, which translates monetary policy to real balances and proﬁts; and
the value of leisure, which aﬀects the transmission from proﬁts to entry
and employment. For conservative parameterizations, money accounts
for some but not that much of trend unemployment — by one measure,
about 1/5 of the increase during the stagﬂation episode of the 70s can be
explained by monetary policy alone. For less conservative but still reason-
able parameters, money accounts for almost all low-frequency movement
in unemployment over the last half century.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since it is very relevant for what we do in this project, we begin by reviewing
an exercise in Lucas (1980). He was interested in two fundamental propositions
from monetary economics: the quantity equation, which can be interpreted as
saying that (other things equal) inﬂation moves one-for-one with the growth
rate in the money supply; and the Fisher equation, which can be interpreted as
saying that (other things equal) the nominal interest rate moves one-for-one with
inﬂation.1 These relations are derived from elementary economic principles, and
are almost ‘model free’ in the sense e.g. that the quantity equation emerges from
a variety of formalizations, and the Fisher equation is basically a no-arbitrage
condition. This does not mean they are consistent with data. Indeed, as Lucas
emphasized, one ought not expect them to hold at each point in time since there
may be a lot going on to complicate matters in the short run; yet they may still
be useful ideas if they are consistent with longer-run observations.
To investigate this, Lucas plotted inﬂa t i o nv s .t h eg r o w t hr a t eo fM1,u s i n g
annual data, from 1955-1975, which we reproduce in the upper left panel of
Figure 1.1, except using quarterly data, and extended to 2005.2 Although the
simple regression line slopes upwards, it is not that easy to see the quantity
equation in the picture — but, again, there may be a lot going on at high fre-
quencies to obscure the relation. So Lucas ﬁltered the data, using progressively
stronger ﬁlters to remove more and more of the short-run ‘noise.’ We do the
same in the other panels of Figure 1.1, using HP ﬁlters with a parameter varying
1Lucas actually looked not at the Fisher equation per se, but the relation between money
growth and nominal rates. If the quantity equation is correct, this amounts to the same thing,
but in any case we look at both.
2All ﬁgures are at the end of the paper. Also, we actually put together data for all
variables discussed below going back to 1948, but focus on the sample starting in 1955 for
three reasons: this is where Lucas started; it gives us exactly a half century of data, which is
a nice round number; and certain series like inﬂation seem especially erratic in the late 40s
a n de a r l y5 0 s . B u tw ea r en o tt r y i n gt oh i d ea n y t h i n g—r e s u l t sf o rt h ef u l ld a t as e ta r ea t
http://www.wwz.unibas.ch/witheo/aleks/BMWII/BMWII.html.
2from 0 to 160,000 as indicated on each panel (Lucas used moving average ﬁlters,
but nothing hinges on this detail). As one can plainly see, with progressively
stronger ﬁltering, a distinct pattern emerges, and eventually it appears that the
quantity equation looks really quite good.
This ﬁnding is robust on several dimensions. One can look at ﬁve-year
averages, a diﬀerent way to ﬁlter the data, shown in the ﬁnal panel of Figure
1.1, and the message is the same. Or one can measure variables in diﬀerent
ways, as we do in Figures 1.2 and 1.3, where we replace M1 by M2 and by M0,
and the picture is similar. One can also redo the exercise in levels (looking at
p vs. M rather than growth in p and M) and the results are similar.3 In terms
of the Fisher equation, Figure 1.4 plots inﬂation vs. the nominal interest rate
using Aaa corporate bonds to deﬁne the nominal rate (the conclusions are similar
using e.g. the T-Bill rate). After we ﬁlter out the ‘noise’ the Fisher equation also
looks very good. Figures 1.5 makes a similar point when we replace inﬂation by
M1 growth (results for M2 and M0 are similar). Just as Lucas concluded from
his exercise, we conclude from this that the ideas represented by the quantity
and Fisher equation hold up quite well in long-run data.
Lucas warns us, however, that the method is risky. Take any two series,
he says, plot progressively stronger ﬁltered versions, and one will see patterns
emerge. To illustrate his point Lucas does the exercise for inﬂation and unem-
ployment, two variables that he ‘knew’ were unrelated at low frequency, in the
sense that he was persuaded by the arguments of Friedman (1967) and Phelps
(1969) that the long-run Phillips curve must be vertical (although he does say
this explicitly, it seems from related work such as Lucas 1973 he bought into
the idea of a ‘natural rate’ independent of inﬂation). Lo and behold, with pro-
gressive ﬁltering, a pattern between inﬂation and unemployment emerged when
3In the interest of space we do not show all the ﬁgures here; go to the address in footnote
2 for additional ﬁgures and much more information, including details of the data sources,
calibration and simulation programs, etc.
3Lucas did it, and emerges even more obviously when we redo it with updated
data. As Figure 1.6 shows, contrary to what Lucas thought he ‘knew’ from
theory, inﬂation and unemployment are related in the long run, and positively.
We like his method for extracting information about long-run relations, but
do not agree with all of Lucas’ conclusions. In terms of method, we are per-
suaded that this ﬁltering technique, while perhaps not perfect, is a useful tool —
in particular, while there is no guarantee that forces driving the short-run devi-
ations are irrelevant for understanding the true long-run relation, the approach
does have the virtue of allowing one to avoid taking a stand on exactly what the
forces are behind the high frequencies. Where we think Lucas went wrong is his
devotion to a vertical long-run Phillips curve. We ﬁnd the evidence of a positive
relation between inﬂation and unemployment about as clear as the evidence for
the quantity or Fisher equation, and based on this data there seems little reason
to deem one observation compelling and another statistical artifact; moreover,
we will argue, a positive long-run relation between these variables is as much
“an implication of a coherent economic theory” as Lucas said the other relations
are.
We are not the ﬁrst to suggest this, and Friedman (1977) himself was tren-
chant when he said the following: “There is a natural rate of unemployment at
any time determined by real factors. This natural rate will tend to be attained
when expectations are on average realized. The same real situation is consistent
with any absolute level of prices or of price change, provided allowance is made
for the eﬀect of price change on the real cost of holding money balances”( e m -
phasis added). He also noted that in the data he was examining at the time one
could see emerging evidence of an upward slope to the long-run Phillips curve
(others have discussed similar points; see Beyer and Farmer 2007 and the ref-
erences therein). Again, we will show here that basic economic theory predicts
such a pattern just as clearly as the data depicts such a pattern.
4Before proceeding we mention some more evidence. In principle, if the Fisher
and quantity equations are valid, it does not matter if we examine the relation-
ship between unemployment and either inﬂation, interest, or money growth
rates. But although the Fisher and quantity equations hold up well in the
longer run, they do not hold exactly. In Figures 1.7 and 1.8 we redo the exercise
replacing inﬂation with interest and M1 growth rates (M2 and M0 give similar
results). Also, in Figures 1.9 to 1.11 we redo the exercises using employment
rather than unemployment.4 Based on all of this, we think there is a clear
negative relation between monetary variables and labor market performance in
the longer run, even if the relation may sometimes go the other way in the
shorter run, including the 60s where a downward sloping Phillips curve is evi-
dent. While we welcome more, and more sophisticated, econometric analyses,
for the purpose of this paper we take this fact as given.
As a ﬁnal application of the method, and because we will need it later,
Figures 1.12 to 1.14 show the relation between the nominal rate and the inverse
of velocity, M/pY, commonly interpreted as money demand. The diﬀerent plots
use M1, M2 and M0. As has been documented many times, the relationship
is negative, although it is confounded by what looks like a structural shift that
occurs some time in the late 80s or early 90s, depending on which panel one
looks at. Similar results obtain when we replace the nominal interest rate by the
inﬂation or money growth rates.5 In any event, we will use some version of this
money demand relation in the calibration below, as is done in most quantitative
monetary economics (see Cooley-Hansen 1989, Lucas 2000, Lagos-Wright 2005,
and the references therein).
4This is complicated by a long-term trend in employment over the sample, presumably
due to demographic and other factors. To control for this we ﬁlter the data twice: once to
eliminate the very long-run trend, and again to eliminate very high-frequency ﬂuctuations.
5That is, the results are similar except for one detail: while M0/pY and M1/pY behave
as expected, a simple regression indicates M2/pY rises with inﬂation or money growth; this
may however be an artifact of the strucutral shift mentioned above (see the website mentioned
in footnote 2).
5We now proceed to theory. Since we are primarily for this paper interested
in the longer-run relation between monetary variables and unemployment, we
abstract from factors commonly believed to matter in the short run, includ-
ing information problems or other forms of real-nominal confusion, as well as
stickiness in wages or prices. Instead, we focus on Friedman’s suggestion that
to understand the eﬀect of monetary variables on the “natural rate” allowance
really must be made for “the eﬀect of price change on the real cost of holding
money balances.” To this end, it seems obvious that it would be good to have
a theory where the cost of holding money balances can be made precise, which
suggests to us a theory where the beneﬁts of holding money balances are made
explicit. Additionally, it would seem good to have a theory of unemployment
that has proven successful in other contexts.
In recent years much progress has been made studying monetary economics
and unemployment using theories that incorporate frictions — in the case of
unemployment, search and matching frictions; and in the case of money, some
sort of double coincidence problem due to specialization and spatial separation,
combined with information problems like imperfect record keeping.6 It is not
surprising that models with frictions are useful for understanding dynamic labor
markets and hence unemployment, as well as for understanding the role of money
and hence inﬂation. However, existing models along these lines analyze either
unemployment or inﬂation in isolation. We integrate these models into a uniﬁed
framework that allows one to analyze unemployment and money together using
logically consistent microfoundations. This theory predicts that inﬂation and
unemployment should move together.
6In terms of unemployment, we have in mind Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), as well as
earlier work by Diamond (1981,1982), Mortensen (1982), Pissarides (1985,1990), Merz (1995),
Andolfatto (1996), and recent contributions by Shimer (2005), Hall (2005), Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2007) and others. In terms of money, we have in mind the model in Lagos and
Wright (2005), but going back to Kiyoatki and Wright (1989,1993), Aiyagari and Wallace
(1991), Matsuyama et al. (1993), Shi (1995,1997), Trejos and Wright (1995), Kochelakota
(1998), Wallace (2001), Williamson (2006), Molico (2006) and others.
6We then consider the issue quantitatively. To this end we calibrate the model
to standard observations, including money demand, and ask how it accounts for
long-run labor market observations over the last half century when we coun-
terfactually assume monetary policy is the only impulse. This is a common
method in modern macro, as epitomized when one asks of the Kydland and
Prescott (1982) model how well it accounts for output ﬂuctuations when the
only impulse is a shock to productivity. As in that application, the target here
is not 100%; we just want to know how much. Although there are details to
discuss, one way to summarize the ﬁndings is to ask the following question: For
reasonable parameter values, how much of an increase in unemployment does
t h em o d e lp r e d i c tf r o mar u nu pi ni n ﬂation or nominal interest rates like we
saw during the stagﬂation of the 70s? The answer, we show, depends on two
key parameters: the value of leisure and money demand elasticity.
For a conservatively low estimate of the money demand elasticity, if we set
the value of leisure so that a real version of the model generates realistic unem-
ployment ﬂuctuations in response to productivity shocks, we account for only
20% of the increase in the raw unemployment series, and around 13% of ﬁltered
unemployment, during stagﬂation. This is nothing to scoﬀ at, but obviously
does leave plenty of room for other factors, including productivity, demograph-
ics, ﬁscal policy etc. However, if we set the value of leisure slightly higher,
the model can account for virtually all of trend unemployment during the pe-
riod, although of course it then generates excessive unemployment ﬂuctuations
in response to real shocks (about double the data). For a bigger money de-
mand elasticity, the basic message is similar, although the model accounts for
more of the data with a low value of leisure, and does not generate as excessive
unemployment ﬂuctuations in response to real shocks.
We conclude that while conservative parameter estimates imply monetary
factors account for some but not the majority of trend unemployment, one does
7not have to stretch parameters too far to account for much more. It should be
no surprise that some parameters matter a lot for the issues at hand. That the
value of leisure can make a big diﬀerence in search-based models of the labor
market is very well known; see e.g. the discussion of Shimer (2005) in Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2007).7 That the elasticity of money demand matters a lot for
the eﬀects of inﬂation is equally well known; see e.g. Lucas (2000). It is to be
expected therefore that both matter in the integrated model. While our results
do depend on parameters, and hence we cannot provide one deﬁnitive number,
they indicate that monetary factors can be important for labor market outcomes
not only theoretically but also quantitatively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the
basic model. In Section 3 we show how to solve for equilibrium in the labor
market taking the goods market as given, and vice-versa, and then put things
together to get general equilibrium. In the presentation in Section 3 we focus on
steady states, and relegate the dynamic-stochastic case to the Appendix. Also,
in Section 3 we use Nash bargaining in both goods and labor markets, but in
Section 4 we consider diﬀerent pricing mechanisms, including price taking and
posting. In Section 5 we present the quantitative analysis. Section 6 concludes
wit a brief summary.8
7The macro-labor literature has not yet converged on the best way to extend the baseline
search model to generate realistic unemployment responses to real shocks, but everyone agrees
that a high value of leisure gets the job done. It is likely that some other ‘tricks’ to generate
realistic unemployment responses to real shocks would also work for us. One way to summarize
this is our robust ﬁnding that an increase in inﬂation from 0 to 10% will have the same impact
as a drop in labor productivity of between 2/3 and 3/2 of 1%, independent of how we specify
the labor market parameters, whose only role is to determine how the eﬀect is propagated to
unemployment.
8Some recent attempts to bring monetary issues to bear on search-based labor models
include Farmer (2005), Blanchard and Gali (2005), and Gertler and Trigari (2006), but they
take a diﬀerent tact by assuming nominal rigidities. We generate interesting eﬀects without
nominal wage or price stickiness, as which seems distinctly preferable given we are inter-
ested in intermediate- to long-run phenomena. Lehmann (2006) is more in line with our
approach, although details are diﬀerent. Shi (1998,1999) and Shi and Wang (2006) are also
worth mentioning. Rocheteau et al. (2006) and Dong (2007) integrate modern monetary
economics into an alternative theory of unemployment — Rogerson’s (1988) indivisible labor
model — and while that approach leads to some interesting results, there are reasons to prefer
Mortensen-Pissarides. Earlier, Cooley and Hansen (1989) stuck a cash-in-advance constraint
82T h e B a s i c M o d e l
Time is discrete and continues forever. Each period, there are three distinct
locations where economic activity takes place: a labor market, in the spirit of
Mortensen-Pissarides; a goods market, in the spirit of Kiyotaki-Wright; and a
general market, in the spirit of Arrow-Debreu. For brevity we call these the MP,
KW and AD markets. While it does not matter for the results, for concreteness
we assume these markets convene sequentially, as shown in Figure 2. Also,
without loss of generality we assume that agents discount at rate β between one
AD market and the next MP market, but not between the other markets. There
are two types of private agents, ﬁrms and households, indexed by f and h.T h e
set of households is [0,1];t h es e to fﬁrms has arbitrarily large measure, although
not all will be active at any point in time. Households work, consume, and enjoy
utility; ﬁrms simply maximize proﬁts and pay out dividends to households.
As is standard in modern theories of unemployment, a household and a ﬁrm
can combine to create a job that produces output y.L e te index employment sta-
tus: e =1indicates that a household (ﬁrm) is matched with a ﬁrm (household);
e =0indicates otherwise. For now, it is easiest to think of agents matching
bilaterally in the MP and KW markets and multilaterally in AD, although we
also discuss other interpretations below. As indicated in Figure 2, there are
three value functions for the three markets, Ui
e, V i
e and Wi
e,w h i c hg e n e r a l l yd e -
pend on type i ∈ {h,f},e m p l o y m e n ts t a t u se ∈ {0,1}, and possibly other state
variables. Also, ˆ Ui
f in the Figure is the MP value function next period, since
a “hat” indicates the value of variables next period (in stationary equilibrium
t h e s ea r et h es a m e ) .
into Rogerson, as Cooley and Quadrini (2004) and Andofatto et al. (2003) did to Mortensen-
Pissarides. Our framework actually nests as special case something that looks like a standard
cash-in-advance model, as well as a money-in-the-utility-function model. We prefer to lay out
the role of money explicitly, however, because the additional generality is useful, and also be-
cause we ﬁnd it easier than having to decide based on implicit theorizing when cash-in-advance
applies, or how money enters utility.
9In the benchmark model discussed in the text, we assume policy and pro-
ductivity are constant, and focus on steady states; in this case, the only state
variable for agents that we need to track, other than i and e, is real balances z.9
We adopt the following convention for measuring real balances, which facilitates
presentation of the dynamic-stochastic model discussed in the Appendix. When
an agent brings in m dollars to the AD market, we let z = m/p,w h e r ep is the
current price level, denote his real balances. He then takes ˆ z =ˆ m/p out of this
market and into next period’s MP market, still deﬂated by p.I fh ew e r et ob r i n g
ˆ z through the next KW market and into the next AD market, its real value is
then given by ˆ zˆ ρ,w h e r eˆ ρ = p/ˆ p converts ˆ z into the units of the numeraire in
that market. Notice ˆ ρ =1 /(1 + π),w h e r eπ is the inﬂation rate between this
and the next AD market.
2.1 Households
We now consider the diﬀerent markets in turn, starting with AD. Household h
with employment status e and real balances z solves
Wh
e (z)=m a x
x,ˆ z
n




st x +ˆ z = ew +( 1− e)(b +  )+∆ − T + z
where x is consumption, w the wage, b UI beneﬁts,   production of x by the
unemployed, ∆ dividend income, and T al u m p - s u mt a x .E m p l o y m e n ts t a t u se
is carried out of AD into MP next period. Notice w is paid in AD even though
matching and bargaining occur in MP (this is not important, but it makes some
things more transparent, as discussed below). Also, as in most of the literature
using MP models, utility is linear in x,a l t h o u g hw eh a v eo t h e rg o o d st r a d e di n
9For matched agents, in principle, the wage w is a state, since it is set in MP and carried
forward to KW and AD, although it can be renegotiated next MP. To reduce clutter in the
text, w is subsumed in the notation; in the Appendix we present the general case where
policy and productivity follow stochastic processes and unemployment varies endogenously
over time, and these variables as well as wages are explicit state variables.
10the KW market where agents have general utility.10
It is useful to provide a few results concerning AD before discussing the
rest of the model. Substituting x from the budget equation into the objective
function in (1), we get
Wh
e (z)=Ie + z +m a x
ˆ z
n




where Ie = ew +( 1− e)(b +  )+∆ − T is income. Notice Wh
e is linear in z
and Ie.M o r e o v e r ,t h ec h o i c eo fˆ z is independent of z and Ie, although it could
depend on e through ˆ Uh
e . However, the KW utility function introduced below
will be independent of e,w h i c hm a k e s∂ ˆ Uh
e /∂ˆ z and hence ˆ z independent of e.
This gives the convenient result that every h exits the AD market with the
same ˆ z, as long as we have an interior solution for x, which we can guarantee
by assuming that b +   is not too small.
In the KW market, a diﬀerent good q is traded, which gives h utility υ(·),
with υ(0) = 0, υ0 > 0 and υ00 < 0.11 In this market, households are anonymous,
which generates an essential role for a medium of exchange. To convey the idea,
suppose h asks f for q now and promises to pay later — say, in the next AD
market. If f does now know who h is, the latter can renege on such promises
without fear of repercussion, so the former insists on quid pro quo. If x is not
storable by h, money steps into the role of medium of exchange (see Kocher-
lakota 1997, Wallace 2001, Corbae et al. 2003, Araujo 2004, and Aliprantis et
al. 2007 for formal discussions). Of course, to make money essential we need
only some anonymous trade — we need not rule out all barter, credit, etc. A
nonmonetary version of the model with perfect credit is of interest in its own
right, embedding as it does a retail sector into MP, and can actually be rendered
10All we really need for tractability is quasi-linearity: everything goes through if we assume
AD utility is x+Υe(x),w h e r ex is a vector of other AD goods. To reduce notation, we assume
a single AD good in the text, and discuss the general case in footnotes.
11We use Greek ‘upsilon’ υ for utility since U denotes the MP value function and u un-
employment. We apologize to those who have trouble distinguishing ‘upsilon’ υ from ‘vee’ v,
which denotes vacancies, but it should always be clear what is meant by the context.
11as a special case when we run the Friedman rule i =0 , since this makes cash
equivalent to perfect credit. But to study the impact of nominal variables like
inﬂation we obviously want to consider a monetary version of the model.
For h with real balances z and employment status e in KW,
V h
e (z)=αhυ(q)+αhWh
e [ρ(z − d)] + (1 − αh)Wh
e (ρz), (3)
where αh is the probability of trade and (q,d) the terms of trade. We multiply
any real balances taken out of KW by ρ to get their value in AD. Using the
linearity of Wh
e , following from (2), we have
V h
e (z)=αh [υ(q) − ρd]+Wh
e (ρz). (4)
The probability αh is given by a CRS matching function: αh = M(B,S)/B,
where B and S are the measures of buyers and sellers in the market. Letting
Q = B/S be the queue length, or market tightness, we have αh = M(Q,1)/Q.
Assume M(Q,1) is strictly increasing in Q,w i t hM(0,1) = 0 and M(∞,1) = 1,
and M(Q,1)/Q is strictly decreasing with M(0,1) = 1 and M(∞,1) = 0
(conditions satisﬁed by most standard matching functions; see Menzio 2007).
As long as the surplus for h in KW is positive, all households participate
and B =1 ; since they are the only ones with output for sale, only ﬁrms with
e =1can participate, and S =1−u where u is the unemployment rate.12 Thus,
αh = M(1,1 − u).T h i s g i v e s u s o u r ﬁrst spillover across markets: buyers in
the goods market are better oﬀ when there are more sellers, which means less
unemployment in the labor market. While the exact relation depends on details,
the robust idea is that it is better to be a buyer when unemployment is low,
because the probability of trade can be better, and also because in equilibrium
the terms of trade can be better.
12To be clear, let u be the unemployment rate starting the period. After the current MP
market, it changes to ˆ u, the rate starting next period, and it is ˆ u rather than u that determines
αh in the KW market. In steady state u =ˆ u, and so we can ignore this for now, but we are
more careful in the dynamic model presented in the Appendix.



















where δ is the exogenous rate at which matches are destroyed and λh the en-
dogenous rate at which they are created. The latter is determined by another
CRS matching function, λh = N(u,v)/u =N(τ,1)/τ,w h e r eu is unemploy-
ment, v is the number of vacancies, and τ = v/u is labor market tightness.
Assume N(1,τ) is strictly increasing in τ,w i t hN(1,0) = 0 and N(1,∞)=1 ,
and N(1,τ)/τ strictly decreasing with N(1,0)/0=1and N(1,∞)=0(again
see Menzio 2007). Wages are determined when ﬁrms and households meet in
MP, although they are paid in the next AD market, which means that we do
not have to worry about whether w is paid in dollars or goods. There is com-
mitment to w within a period, but in ongoing matches it can be renegotiated
next period when MP reconvenes.
This completes the household problem. Before moving on, we show how to
collapse the three markets into one handy equation. Substituting V h
e (z) from
(4) into (5) and using the linearity of Wh
e ,w eh a v e
Uh
1 (z)=αh [υ(q) − ρd]+ρz + δWh
0 (0) + (1 − δ)Wh
1 (0)
Something similar can be done for Uh
0 . Updating these to next period and
inserting into (2), the AD problem becomes
Wh
e (z)=Ie + z +m a x
ˆ z
n
−ˆ z + βˆ αh
h
υ(ˆ q) − ˆ ρˆ d
i
+ βˆ ρˆ z
o
+ βEˆ e ˆ Wh
ˆ e (0) (7)
where the expectation is wrt next period’s employment status ˆ e conditional on
e. We will see that the terms of trade (ˆ q, ˆ d) in the next KW market do not
depend on ˆ e — see (14) below — so therefore (7) implies ˆ z is independent of e, Ie
and z.
132.2 Firms












1 +( 1− λf)V
f
0 , (9)
where λf = N(u,v)/v = N(1,τ)/τ. This is completely standard. Where we
deviate from textbook MP theory is that, rather than having f and h each con-
sume a share of their output, in our model, f takes y to the goods market, where
he looks trade with other agents. The uncontroversial idea is that people do not
necessarily want to consume what they make each day at work. This generates
a role for a separate goods, or retail, sector. Although it might be interesting to
proceed diﬀerently in future work, for now we consolidate production and retail
activity within the ﬁrm.
As we said above, f participates in KW iﬀ e =1 .W h e nf makes a sale of q
in this market, the rest of the output y−q is transformed into x = ζ(y−q) units
of the AD good later that period, with ζ
0 ≥ 0 and ζ
00 ≤ 0 (there is a constraint
q ≤ y, but it is easy to give conditions making this slack). We could also simply
assume unsold output vanishes between the KW and AD markets, but we like
the idea of giving f an opportunity cost of KW trade.13 It is useful to write
the opportunity cost as c(q)=ζ(y)−ζ(y−q). Unless otherwise stated, we take
ζ to be linear, so x = y − q and c(q)=q, although in Section 4.2 we use the
general case. With ζ linear, we can interpret x and q as one good that f can
store across markets, but since h generally values it diﬀerently in KW and AD,
f wants to sell at least some of it in the ﬁrst market.
13One could alternatively assume y − q is carried forward to the next KW market, but
then we would need to track the inventory distribution across ﬁrms. Having them liquidate
inventories in the AD market allows us to have an opportunity cost of trade while avoiding
this technical problem, just like the AD market allows us to avoid tracking a distribution of
m o n e yh o l d i n g sa c r o s sh o u s e h o l d si nt h eK Wm a r k e t .
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given wage commitment w. Simplifying, we get
V
f









where R = y +αf(ρd−q) is expected revenue in units of the AD good. This is
our second spillover eﬀect: the terms of trade in the goods market (q,d) aﬀects
R, and in equilibrium this aﬀects entry and ultimately employment. Again the
exact relation depends on details, but the robust idea is that as long as ﬁrms are
deriving at least some of their proﬁts from cash transactions, monetary factors
aﬀect their decisions.
T om o d e le n t r y ,a si ss t a n d a r d ,w ea s s u m ea n yf with e =0has no current
revenue or wage obligations, but can pay k in units of x in any AD market
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0 = ˆ W
f
0 =0by free entry. In steady state k = βλfV
f
1 , which by (12)
can be written
k =
βλf (R − w)
1 − β(1 − δ)
. (13)
Average proﬁta c r o s sa l lﬁrms in a period is (1 − u)(R − w) − vk.A sw es a i d ,
ﬁrms pay out proﬁt as dividends. If we assume the representative h holds the
representative portfolio — say, shares in a mutual fund — this gives the equilibrium
dividend ∆.
152.3 Government
The government consumes G,p a y sU Ib e n e ﬁt b,l e v i e st a xT, and prints money
at rate π,s ot h a t ˆ M =( 1+π)M, where in steady state π is inﬂation. Hence,
their period budget constraint is G+bu = T +πM/p,w h i c hw ea s s u m eh o l d sa t
every date (without loss of generality, since Ricardian equivalence holds). For
steady state analysis, we can equivalently describe monetary policy in terms of
setting the nominal interest rate i or the growth rate of money π,b yv i r t u eo ft h e
Fisher equation 1+i =( 1+π)/β. In the stochastic model in the Appendix we
specify policy in terms of interest rate rules. We always assume i>0,a l t h o u g h
we can take the limit as i → 0, which is the Friedman rule.
3 Equilibrium
Various assumptions can be made concerning price determination in our diﬀer-
ent markets, including bargaining, price taking, and price posting, with either
directed or undirected search. We think the most reasonable scenario is the fol-
lowing: price taking in the AD market; wage bargaining with undirected search
in MP; and price posting with directed search in KW. We like price taking in
the AD market because it is simple, and in any case the AD market is not our
prime focus. In the MP market, bargaining seems realistic and is standard in
the literature, although it is actually a simple reinterpretation here to alterna-
tively say that our labor market has wage posting with directed search. The
issues are less clear for the KW market, so we explicitly analyze several options:
bargaining, price taking, and price posting with directed search.14
Posting with directed search — also known as competitive search equilibrium
14We emphasize that in the labor market posting with directed search is equivalent to
generalized Nash bargaining with a particular bargaining power (the Hosios 1990 condition),
but this is not true for the goods market. This is because there is a double holdup problem
i nt h eg o o d sm a r k e t ,w i t he xa n t ei n v e s t m e n ti nm o n e yb yh and entry by f, that cannot be
resolved for any bargaining power parameter.
16— is attractive in the goods market for a variety of reasons.15 However, we
present bargaining ﬁrst, mainly because it is easy and standard in the literature.
In any case, we break the analysis into three parts. First, taking unemployment
u as given, we determine the value of money in the goods market q as in Lagos-
Wright (2005). Then, taking q as given, we determine u in the labor market as in
Mortensen-Pissarides (1996). It is convenient to depict these results graphically
in (u,q) space as the LW curve and MP curve. Their intersection determines
the unemployment rate and the value of money, from which all other variables
follow, in steady state.
3.1 The Goods Market
Imagine for now that in the KW market f and h meet and bargain bilaterally
over (q,d),s u b j e c tt od ≤ z and q ≤ y, obviously, since neither party can trade
more than they have. We use generalized Nash bargaining (Aruoba et al. 2007
study several other bargaining solutions in this kind of model). Let the threat
points be given by continuation values, and let θ ∈ (0,1] be the bargaining
power of h.T h e s u r p l u s f o r h is υ(q)+Wh
e [ρ(z − d)] − Wh
e (ρz)=υ(q) − ρd.
Similarly, the surplus for f is ρd − q.I t i s e a s y t o s h o w d = z (intuitively,
because it is costly to carry cash when we are not at the Friedman rule; see
Lagos-Wright for details). Given this, the ﬁrst order condition from maximizing





15First, it is fairly tractable after one incurs an initial set-up cost. Second, it has some
desirable eﬃciency properties (see e.g. Kircher 2007). Third, directed search should seem
like a big step forward to those who criticize monetary theory with random matching for the
assumption of randomness per se (Howitt 2005). It should also appease those who dismiss
modern monetary economics because they “don’t like bargaining” (Phelan 2005). More se-
riously, posting models avoid the assumption that agents see each others’ money balances,
usually made in bargaining models to avoid technical diﬃculties with private information.
Finally, competitive search eliminates bargaining power as a free parameter, which is useful
in calibration.
17Now recall (7), which in terms of the choice of ˆ z is summarized by
max
ˆ z
{−ˆ z + βˆ αhυ(ˆ q)+β(1 − ˆ αh)ˆ ρˆ z},
where we inserted ˆ d =ˆ z, and it is understood that ˆ q is a function of ˆ z as given in
(14). Taking the FOC for an interior solution, then inserting ∂ˆ q/∂ˆ z =ˆ ρ/g1(ˆ q,θ),







To reduce this to one equation in (u,q) we do three things: (i) use the Fisher
equation for the nominal interest rate to eliminate 1/βˆ ρ =1+i; (ii) insert the







This is the LW curve, determining q exactly as in Lagos and Wright (2005),
except there αh was ﬁxed and now αh =M(1,1−u).A ni n c r e a s ei nu makes it
less attractive to be a buyer, as discussed above. This reduces the choice of ˆ z,
and hence reduces q via the bargaining solution. The LW curve is convenient
because properties follow from well-known results in the literature — e.g. simple
conditions guarantee the RHS of (15) is monotone in q, and hence a unique
q>0 solves (15) for any u ∈ (0,1),w i t h∂q/∂u < 0.16 Also, letting q∗ solve
υ0(q∗)=1 ,w ek n o wq<q ∗ for all i>0. Summarizing these and some other
properties, we have:
Proposition 1 For all i>0 the LW curve slopes downward in (u,q) space,
with u =0implying q ∈ (0,q∗) and u =1implying q =0 . It shifts down with
i a n du pw i t hθ.I n t h e l i m i t a s i → 0, q → q0 for all u<1,w h e r eq0 is
independent of u,a n dq0 ≤ q∗ with q0 = q∗ iﬀ θ =1 .
16Conditions that make the RHS of (15) monotone are: (i) u0 log-concave; or (ii) θ ≈ 1.
Wright (2008) dispenses with these kinds of conditions entirely and proves there is generically
a unique steady state q with ∂q/∂u < 0 even if the RHS of (15) is not monotone.
183.2 The Labor Market
Suppose that when f and h meet in MP they bargain over w,w i t ht h r e a tp o i n t s
equal to continuation values, and η the bargaining power of f. It is routine to
solve this for
w =
η[1 − β (1 − δ)](b +  )+( 1− η)[1− β (1 − δ − λh)]R
1 − β (1 − δ)+( 1− η)βλh
. (16)
If we substitute this and R = y + αf(ρd − q) into (13), the free entry condition
becomes
k =
λfη[y − b −   + αf (ρd − q)]
r + δ +( 1− η)λh
.
To reduce this to one equation in (u,q) we do three things: (i) use the steady
state condition (1 − u)δ = N(u,v) to write v = v(u) and τ = τ(u)=v(u)/u;
(ii) insert the arrival rates λf(u)=N [1,τ(u)]/τ(u), λh(u)=N [1,τ(u)] and
αf(u)=M(1,1−u)/(1 − u); and (iii) use the bargaining solution to eliminate
ρd − q = g(q,θ) − q =











r + δ +( 1− η)λh(u)
. (17)
This is the MP curve, determining u as in Mortensen-Pissarides (1996), except
the total surplus here is not just y − b −  , but includes as an extra term the
expected surplus from retail trade. Routine calculations show this curve is
downward sloping. Intuitively, there are three eﬀects from an increase in u,t w o
from the textbook model plus a new one, all of which encourage entry: (i) λf(u)
goes up (it is easier for f to hire); (ii) λf(u) goes down (it is harder for h to get
hired, which lowers w); and (iii) αf(u) goes up (it is easier for f to compete in
the goods market). Summarizing this and other properties:
Proposition 2 The MP curve slopes downward in (u,q) space. It shifts in with
y or η,a n do u tw i t hk, r, δ, θ, b or  .
193.3 Steady State Equilibrium
Propositions 1 and 2 imply LW and MP both slope downward in a box B =
[0,1]×[0,q∗] in (u,q) space, shown in Figure 3. Notice LW enters B from the left
at u =0and q0 ≤ q∗ and exits at (1,0), while MP enters where q = q∗ at some
u > 0,w i t hu < 1 iﬀ k is not too big, and exits by either hitting the horizontal
axis at u0 ∈ (0,1) or hitting the vertical axis at q1 ∈ (0,q∗).I ti se a s yt oc h e c k
the former case, shown by the curve labeled 1, occurs iﬀ η(y − b −  ) >k (r+δ),
which is the usual condition required for u<1 in the MP model. In this case,
there exists a nonmonetary steady state at (u0,0), which is the standard MP
equilibrium, plus at least one monetary steady state with q>0 and u<u 0.
The Figure also shows cases labeled 2 and 3, where there either exist multiple
or no monetary steady states, plus a steady state at (u,q)=( 1 ,0) where the
KW and MP markets shut down.
To understand which case is more likely, look at Propositions 1 and 2, since
those results tell us how the curves shift with parameters, and hence how the
conﬁguration depends on parameters. In any case, the discussion in the previous
paragraph establishes existence of steady state equilibrium. Clearly we do not
have uniqueness, in general. Monetary and nonmonetary equilibria may coexist,
but it is possible for monetary steady state to be unique, as turns out to be the
case in the calibrations below. If there exists any steady state with u<1,w h i c h
again is true iﬀ η(y − b −  ) >k (r+δ), then there will exist a monetary steady
state. Once we have (u,q), we easily recover all other endogenous variables,
including vacancies v,a r r i v a lr a t e sαj and λj, real balances z = g(q,θ),a n ds o
on.17
17In particular, the nominal price level is p = M/g(q,θ), and the AD budget equation yields
x for every h as a function of z and Ie. In the general case where AD utility is x + Υe(x),
utility maximization determines individual demand as a function of e and p (plus p which
we already know), say x = De(p).M a r k e td e m a n di sD(p)=uD0(p)+( 1− u)D1(p),a n d
equating this to the endowment ¯ x yields a standard system of GE equations that solve for
p. We get classical neutrality: if M changes, we can change p and p proportionally without
aﬀecting the AD equilibrium conditions or (u,q). We do not generally get superneutrality:
20A convenient result from Propositions 1 and 2 is that changes in i shift only
the LW curve, while changes in y, η, r, k, δ, b or   shift only the MP curve, which
makes it easy to analyze changes in parameters. An increase in i shifts the LW
curve in toward the origin, reducing q and u if equilibrium is unique (or in the
‘natural’ equilibria if we do not have uniqueness). The result ∂q/∂i < 0 holds in
the standard LW model, with ﬁxed αh, but now there is a general equilibrium
multiplier eﬀect via u that reduces αh and further reduces q.A ni n c r e a s ei nb
shifts the MP curve out, increasing u and reducing q if equilibrium is unique
(or in the ‘natural’ equilibria). The result ∂u/∂z > 0 u holds in the standard
MP model, with ﬁxed R, but now there is a multiplier eﬀect via q that reduces
R and further increases u. Other experiments can be analyzed similarly.
Summarizing, we have established the following results:
Proposition 3 Steady state equilibrium always exist. One steady state is the
nonmonetary equilibrium, which entails u<1 iﬀ η(y − b −  ) >k (r+δ).I ft h i s
inequality holds, there exists at least one monetary steady state. Assuming the
monetary steady state is unique, a rise in i decreases q and increases u,w h i l ea
rise in y or η, or a fall in k, r, δ, b or  ,i n c r e a s e sq and decreases u.
4 Alternative Pricing Mechanisms
As discussed, there are reasons to consider alternatives to bargaining in the
goods market. Here we consider price posting and directed search. We also
consider price-taking, which may be of interest because it can be reduced as a
special case to something that looks like a common cash-in-advance or money-in-
the-utility-function speciﬁcation. We maintain bargaining in the labor market,
although, as mentioned above, one can reinterpret the same equations as coming
any change in i shifts the LW curve, which aﬀects (q,u) and the rest of the system. When Υe
does not depend on e, however, neither does De(p),i nw h i c hc a s eD(˜ p) is independent of u
and hence x is independent of monetary factors — a version of the neoclassical dichotomy.
21from competitive search by setting bargaining power in MP according to the
Hosios (1990) condition.
4.1 Price Posting
We assume sellers post, and buyers direct their search to preferred sellers.18
Agents take into account that if a group of B buyers direct their search towards
ag r o u po fS sellers, the number of meetings is M(B,S).T h u s , Q = B/S
determines the trade probabilities αf = M(Q,1) and αh = M(Q,1)/Q.T ob e
precise, imagine f posting the following message in the AD market: “Condi-
tional on e =1i nt h en e x tM Pm a r k e t ,Ic o m m i tt os e l lq units for d dollars in
the KW market, but I can serve at most one customer, and you should expect
queue length Q.”
The equilibrium surplus h gets from participating in the KW market, from
the perspective of the AD market, where he has to acquire the cash, is given by
˜ Σ = −˜ d + βαh( ˜ Q)υ(˜ q)+β
h
1 − αh( ˜ Q)
i
ρ˜ d,
where (˜ q, ˜ d) and ˜ Q are the the equilibrium terms of trade and queue length;
h also has the option of not participating, which yields ˜ Σ =0 .T h u s ,f posts
(q,d) to maximize V
f
1 , which from (12) is simply αf(Q)(ρd−q) plus a constant,
st the constraint that in order to get Q>0 his buyers must receive a surplus
Σ equal to the market surplus ˜ Σ. Formally, assuming f wants Q>0, think of
him choosing Q as well as (q,d) to solve
max
q,d,Q
M(Q,1)(ρd − q) (18)




18One can also have buyers post to attract sellers, or have third parties (market makers)
post to attract buyers and sellers, and get the same set of equilibrium conditions; see Moen
(1997), Shimer (1996), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Julien et al. (2000), Burdett et al.
(2001), Mortensen and Wright (2002), Rochteau and Wright (2005), Faig and Huangfu (2005)
and Menzio (2007).
22Using βρ =1 /(1 + i) and the equilibrium condition Σ = ˜ Σ,w ed e r i v et h e





ρd = g[q, (Q)] (20)
Σ = βαh(Q){υ(q) − υ0(q)g[q, (Q)]}, (21)
where g(·) is deﬁn e di n( 1 4 ) ,a n d (Q) is the elasticity of M wrt B evaluated
at Q. Notice (19) looks like the equilibrium condition in a standard search-and-
bargaining model of money when buyers make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers, while
(20) looks like the usual bargaining solution with θ replaced by  (Q).A si nt h e
related the literature, this means competitive search eliminates holdup problems
on both the trade and entry (intensive an extensive) margins.
Let q(i,Q) be the q that solves (19), and notice it is strictly decreasing in i
and Q. Substituting q(i,Q) into (21) give us an equation in Q and Σ.D e n o t e
the LHS of (21) by Φ(q,Q), and for the sake of tractability assume Φ1(q,Q) > 0,
Φ2(q,Q) < 0.19 This implies there is a unique solution Q = Q(Σ) ≥ 0 to (21).
Moreover, it is strictly decreasing, equals Q(i) > 0 when Σ =0 , and equals 0
when Σ ≥ υ(q∗) − q∗ − iq∗.O f t e nQ(Σ) is interpreted as the ‘demand’ for Q,
determining the queue length a seller wants as a function of the market ‘price’
Σ. The ‘supply’ of Q is simple: if Σ > 0 then every h participates in KW, so
Q =( 1−u)−1;a n di fΣ =0then h is indiﬀerent to participating, so the number
of participants can be any B ∈ [0,1]. See Figure 4.1.
Equilibrium equates ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ for Q.L e t t i n gu(i) ≡ 1−1/Q(i),
we have that q then depends on u as follows:
u ≤ u(i)= ⇒ Q =( 1− u)−1 and υ0(q) − 1=i/αh (Q) (22)





19Note that Φ2 < 0 holds for the usual matching functions, while a suﬃcient condition for
Φ1 > 0 is that  (Q) is not too small.
23This is the LW curve with competitive search. It is downward sloping in (u,q)
space and shifts in with i, as under bargaining. The only complication is that
once we increase u beyond u(i), there is no Σ > 0 that clears the market for Q,
so we get Σ =0 , Q = Q(i),a n dq =q(i) where q(i) solves (23). That is, the LW
curve kinks and becomes horizontal at u(i).T o ﬁn dt h ep o i n tw h e r ei tk i n k s ,
solve (21) with Σ =0for q(i)=ψ[u(i)], which implies ψ
0 ≥ 0.I fM(B,S) is
Cobb-Douglas, e.g., then q(i) is independent of u(i) and ψ(u) is horizontal.








r + δ +( 1− η)λh(u)
, (24)
which is identical to (17) except we replace θ by the elasticity   =  (Q),w i t h









no longer depend on u. As Figure 4.2 shows, the
MP curve is downward sloping with a kink at u(i). Note that when u>u(i),
the MP curve now depends on i directly (this happens in one version of the
calibrated model, as seen Figure 7 below). But apart from these minor technical
modiﬁcations, the model with posting is similar to bargaining.
4.2 Price Taking
Search models with Walrasian price taking go back to the Lucas and Prescott
(1974) model of unemployment, where it may take time to get from one local
labor market to another, but each one contains large numbers of workers and
ﬁrms who behave competitively. We can tell the same story about our goods
market, and have agents take the price of q in terms of AD goods parametrically
(money remains essential, because of anonymity, even with Walrasian pricing).
We also generalize Lucas-Prescott by allowing agents to get into the goods mar-
ket only probabilistically. Additionally we now allow a nonlinear opportunity
cost, so that revenue is R = ζ(y)+αf £
qfρ − c(qf)
¤
, because a linear cost im-
24plies proﬁts are 0 in equilibrium, which would make u independent of q,a sw e
discuss below.
Every f with e =1wants to get into the KW market. Those that do get in
choose qf to maximize qfρ−c(qf), which implies c0(qf)=ρ.T h e ni nA D ,w i t h








r + δ +( 1− η)λh
, (25)
where αf is the probability f gets into KW.20 Every h wants to get into this







qh ≤ z. The constraint binds as usual in equilibrium. In AD, h chooses ˆ z to
maxˆ z {−ˆ z + βˆ αhυ(ˆ q)+β(1 − ˆ αh)ˆ ρˆ z},w h e r eˆ αh is his probability of getting into







Search-type frictions are captured by letting the measures of agents that
get in to a market depend on the measures that try to get in, which means
αh(u)=Mh(1,1−u) and αf(u)=Mf(1,1−u)/(1−u). Goods market clearing
implies Mhqh = Mfqf. Inserting qh = q and qf = qMh/Mf = q/(1 − u),a s
well as λh and λf, into (26) and (25), we get the LW and MP curves with
Walrasian pricing in the goods market. A special case is the frictionless version,
w h e r ee v e r y o n ew h ow a n t sg e t si n ,Mh =1and Mf =1− u. In this special
























r + δ +( 1− η)λh(u)
20We emphasize that that there are two distinct notions of entry here: ﬁrst f pays k to get
into the MP market (post a vacancy); then, once f produces, there is a probability αf that
he gets into the KW market (if he does not he transits directly to AD). Similarly, h only gets
into KW with probability αh. As a special case, of course, αf or αh or both can be 1.
25If we additionally impose linear cost, c(q)=q,t h e nu vanishes from LW and
q vanishes from MP. In this special case, therefore, the LW curve is horizontal
and the MP curve vertical.
In other words, the model dichotomizes in the case where: (i) there are no
frictions; and (ii) c(q)=q. Actually, while (i) and (ii) are needed to solve LW for
q independently of u, only the latter is needed to solve MP for u independently
of q. Based on this, one can reinterpret the standard MP model as one where
ﬁrms indeed sell their output in a market to households other than their own
employees — for cash or credit, it is irrelevant in this case — since as long as the
cost in this market is linear and pricing is Walrasian, ﬁrms get none of the gains
from trade, and u is determined as in the standard model. There may or may
not be monetary exchange lurking behind the scenes, but this does not aﬀect
vacancy creation or unemployment.21
One could say that when αh = αf =1this model looks like a standard cash-
in-advance economy, in the sense that there are no search or non-competitive
pricing issues. One could also say it looks like a money-in-the-utility-function
speciﬁcation, since after all real balances do appear in the value (indirect utility)
functions. This is all ﬁn e . I ti sb e c a u s ew el i k et og oi n t om o r ed e t a i la b o u t
the assumptions that make money useful, and to allow for search frictions and
alternative pricing mechanisms, that we did not start with a cash-in-advance or
money-in-the-utility-function speciﬁcation. But for those wed to a reduced-form
approach, we point out that a frictionless version of our model with Walrasian
pricing leads to the same set of equations. To put it another way, one can derive
the LW and MP curves without microfoundations for money. We prefer to be
more explicit about the exchange process, not only for aesthetic reasons, but
because this gives more general results, leads to additional insights, and is no
more diﬃcult.
21One can get something similar in the bargaining model by setting θ =1 .
265 Quantitative Analysis
Theory predicts an increase in inﬂation or interest rates increases unemploy-
ment, because this raises the eﬀective tax on cash-intensive goods markets,
which reduces proﬁt and employment (note that for the parameter values cal-
ibrated below equilibrium is unique, so these results are unambiguous). We
now ask how big the eﬀects might be. As we said, the model is best suited
to lower-frequency observations, since we abstract from complications that may
matter in the short run, like imperfect information, rigidities etc. Although
the model could be used to address many quantitative issues, here we focus on
examining how Friedman’s “natural rate of unemployment” is aﬀected by mon-
etary factors. Thus, we ask, how well can the model account for low-frequency
dynamics in unemployment when the driving force is counterfactually assumed
to be nothing except changes in monetary policy?22
We use the version with competitive search in the goods market and bar-
gaining in the labor market. However, as is common, we set bargaining power η
in the latter to the elasticity of the matching function a là Hosios (1990), which
can be interpreted as imposing competitive search in MP. We also tried other
versions, including bargaining and price taking in KW, and the results were
similar in terms of the big picture if not all the details.23 Although so far we
focused on steady states, the dynamic-stochastic generalization is presented in
the Appendix. There we allow randomness in monetary policy, as described by
an interest rate rule b i = i + ρi(i − i)+ i,  i ∼ N(0,σi), and in productivity, as
described by a similar stochastic process for y. For most of our experiments we
22To be clear, for the purpose of this exercise, we take money to be exogenous and look at
t h er e s p o n s eo fu.Ad i ﬀerent approach might assume u varies for some other reason and look
at the endogenous response of policy — but that would be diﬀerent approach.
23We think this is important, and helps to motivate studying the diﬀerent price mechanisms
in the ﬁrst place — how else would one know if it matters? To be clear, we are not saying
the price mechanism is unimportant: for given parameters, it makes a diﬀerence if we assume
bargaining or posting, e.g., but if we change the mechanism and then recalibrate parameters
we get similar results.
27take y to be constant in order to isolate the eﬀects of money, and only use the
model with real shocks as an aid in calibration.
5.1 Parameters and Targets
We choose a quarter as the period and look at 1955-2005, as in the Introduction.
We need to calibrate: (i) preferences as described by β,   and υ(q); (ii) technology
as described by δ, k, N(u,v) and M(B,S); (iii) policy as described by b and
the process for i. Utility is given by υ(q)=Aq1−a/(1 − a). Following much
of the literature, we take the MP matching function to be N(u,v)=Zu1−σvσ
(truncated to keep probabilites below 1). We take the KW matching function
to be M(B,S)=S [1 − exp(−B/S)], the so-called urn-ball technology, which
is a parsimonious speciﬁcation and one that can be derived endogenously using
directed search theory (Burdett et al. 2001; Albrect et al. 2006). This leaves
four parameters describing preferences (β, ,A,a), four describing technology





Calibration is fairly standard. First, set β to match the average quarterly
real interest rate, measured as the diﬀerence between the nominal rate and
inﬂation. Then set the elasticity 1 − σ of the MP matching function to the
regression coeﬃcient of the job-ﬁnding rate on labor market tightness, both
expressed in logs. Then set UI so that in equilibrium the replacement rate is
b/w =0 .5. Then set parameters of the i process (i,ρi,σi) to match the average
quarterly nominal rate, its autocorrelation and variance. Then set (δ,k,Z) to
match the average unemployment, vacancy and and job-ﬁnding rates — although
we can normalize the vacancy rate to v =1by choice of units, which aﬀects
the calibrated value of Z but nothing else. This leaves only the preference
parameters (A,a, ), which we now discuss.
We set (A,a) to match money demand in the data with that implied by
theory. In the model, M/pY is given by M/p = g(q) over Y = M(1,1 −
28u)[g(q) − q]+( 1− u)y,w h e r eb o t hq and u depend on i.I nt e r m so fd a t a ,w e
target average M/pY plus some measure of its responsiveness to i,u s i n gM1
as our notion of money.24 One method is to target directly the elasticity of
M/pY wrt i, which we estimate to be around −0.7 using several speciﬁcations
and periods of diﬀerent lengths, summarized in Figure 5.1. The implied money
demand curve is shown in Figure 5.2, and ﬁts well, at least up to the 90s. A
diﬀerent tack is to simply match the slope of a regression line through the data
in Figure 5.2, which also ﬁts well, at least ignoring the 80s. Although this
method does not target elasticity directly, the implied parameters do generate
a money demand relation, with a bigger elasticity of around −1.4.W ep r e s e n t
results for both low and high elasticities, since both generate what look to us
like reasonable money demand curves.25
Table 1: Calibration Targets
Description Value
average real rate r (quarterly) 0.00816
average nominal rate i (quarterly) 0.01803
autocorrelation of i 0.990
standard deviation of i 0.006
average money demand M/pY (annual) 0.169
money demand elasticity (negative) 0.7 or 1.4
average unemployment u 0.058
average vacancies v (normalization) 1
average UI replacement rate b/w 0.500
average job-ﬁnding rate λh (monthly) 0.450
elasticity of λh wrt v/u 0.280
The targets described above are summarized in Table 1. They are suﬃcient
to pin down all but one of our 12 parameters, the value of leisure  .A si sw e l l
24We use M1 mainly to facilitate comparison with the literature. Although at ﬁrst blush
it may seem M0 i sb e t t e rs u i t e dt ot h et h e o r y ,o n ec a nr e f o r m u l a t et h i sk i n do fm o d e ls ot h a t
demand deposits circulate in KW, either instead of or along with currency; see Berentsen et
al. (2007), He et al. (2007), Chiu and Meh (2007), or Li (2007).
25These observations also pin down the share of the KW market: simply divide nominal
spending in KW M(1,1−u)M by total nominal spending pY to get M(1,1−u) times money
demand M/pY. Adjusting from an annual to a quarterly frequency, M1/pY is 0.676,a n da t
the steady state u =0 .058 our matching function yields M(1,1 − u)=0 .616, implying the
KW market contributes around 42% and the AD market around 58% of total spending.
29known,   is diﬃcult to calibrate and can matter a lot — this is at the heart
of the diﬀerence between Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn-Manovskii (2007). Our
approach is to be agnostic and consider various strategies for  .I no u rU I( f o r
‘unemployment insurance’) calibration we impose   =0 ,a si nS h i m e r .I no u r
BC (for ‘business cycle’) calibration we set   so that a real version of the model,
with shocks to y calibrated to the data and constant i, generates cyclical ﬂuctua-
tions in u consistent with the evidence, which is close to Hagedorn-Manovskii.26
Finally, in our BF (for ‘best ﬁt’) calibration we choose   to minimize the devia-
tions between HP-ﬁltered u in the data and in the model, using either a low or
a high HP parameter of 1600 or 160000.
Although we report the calibrated parameter values from the UI method, we
will actually spend very little time in the rest of the paper on this version of the
model (but see the webpage mentioned in footnote 2) because, as one should
expect from the literature, it generates almost no response of u to shocks, to
either y or to i. As mentioned above, our position is macro-labor economists
have yet to settle on the deﬁnitive way to solve the ‘puzzle’ of getting u to move
more in response to shocks, but all seem to agree that a high value for   (given
b) gets the job done. So for this exercise we let   do the work. But, in principle,
some other ways of making u more response to shocks, including e.g. those
discussed in Nagapal and Mortensen (2007) or in Menzio and (Shi 2008), could
work as well for our purposes.
Thus, for both the case of a low and a high money demand elasticity, we focus
on three   calibrations: the BC method, the BF method with a low HP ﬁlter,
and the BF method with a high ﬁlter. Calibrated preference and technology
parameters are reported in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 for the case of a low and high
26For the record, Hagedorn-Maovskii do not pick   to match the volatility of u,b u tt a r g e t
other observables. When we say we are close to them, we mean that our ratio of b +   to y,
which is what matters, is close to theirs. We are aware of issues involved with high values of
  as in Hagedorn-Maovskii, including the critique by Costain and Ritter (2007), but we think
the approach in Rogerson et al. (2008) can in principle address that problem.
30money demand elasticity, respectively; to save space, the tables omit the policy
parameters, which in all cases are b =0 .5, i =0 .018, ρi =0 .984 and σi =
8.9 · 10−4.N o t i c e b +   is close to and sometimes above y =1 .T h i s i s n o t a
problem, since the suplus from creating a job here is y − b −   plus expected
proﬁt from retail trade; when y − b −  <0, it merely means ﬁrms would not
hire if the retail sector shut down, which seems reasonable.
Table 2.1: Parameters with MD elasticity 0.7
Description UI BC BF 1600 BF 160000
β discount factor 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.992
  value of nonmarket activity 0 0.489 0.502 0.502
A KW utility weight 1.013 1.013 1.013 1.013
a KW utility elasticity 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
δ job destruction rate 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
k vacancy posting cost 1.05·10−2 3.72·10−4 9.67·10−5 9.44·10−5
Z MP matching eﬃciency 0.364 0.364 0.364 0.364
σ MP matching u elasticity 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
Table 2.2: Parameters with MD elasticity 1.4
Description UI BC BF 1600 BF 160000
β discount factor 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.992
  value of nonmarket activity 0 0.485 0.500 0.500
A KW utility weight 1.020 1.020 1.020 1.020
a KW utility elasticity 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
δ job destruction rate 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
k vacancy posting cost 1.05·10−2 3.93·10−4 8.79·10−5 8.72·10−4
Z MP matching eﬃciency 0.364 0.364 0.364 0.364
σ MP matching u elasticity 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72
5.2 Results
We ﬁrst solve for recursive equilibrium in the general dynamic model presented
in the Appendix, where we allow stochastic processes for both the interest rate
i and productivity y. We then feed in the actual path of i, holding y constant,
and calculate the implied path for u. This is our prediction for unemployment
in the counterfactual case where the only impulses over the period were changes
31in monetary policy. We compare the predictions of the model and the data in
terms of u,w h e r eu has been ﬁltered to various degrees (in both the model and
the data). We then look at statistics and plots of the variables in question.
Consider ﬁrst the case of a low money demand elasticity. Figures 6.1 and
6.2 each summarize the results of the BC calibration in two ways: scatter plots
of trend (ﬁltered) i vs. u and π vs. u; and the time series of trend (ﬁltered) u
as well as the raw (unﬁltered) series. In Figure 6.1 we use a high HP ﬁlter
parameter of 160000, while in Figure 6.2 we use the lower ﬁlter of 1600. As one
can see, this BC version of the model with relatively inelastic money demand
implies that monetary policy alone can account for a little, but not that much,
of the behavior of u over the last ﬁfty years. We get nothing like the big swings
in u observed in the data, even after ﬁltering, although qualitatively the model
clearly does correctly predict the broad pattern of u rising in the ﬁrst half and
falling in the second half of the sample.
To use one summary statistic, consider the runup in u over the worse part of
the stagﬂation episode, between the ﬁrst quarters of 1972 and 82.27 As shown
in Table 4.1, this version of the model accounts for only part of the increase in
u during this episode. Depending on how much of the high frequency we ﬁlter
out, trend u rose between 22% and 43% during this ten-year period, while the
model predicts much less of an increase. Looking at unﬁltered data, e.g., we
only predict 8%, as compared to the actual 41% increase in u —t h a ti s ,w eg e t
only 20% of the observed increase. Similarly, the model can account for 12%
and 14% of the observed increase in low and high ﬁltered u during the episode.
Again, with the BC calibration and a low money demand elasticity, one might
conclude the model accounts for something, but not all that much.
27We did not chose this subsample to represent stagﬂation in order to ‘cook the results’ in
any sense, but for the following three reasons. First, both i and u are close to their steady
state values in 1972Q1. Second, 1982Q1 has the highest value of i =1 5 .1 in the sample, as
well as a a very high u =0 .088. Third, this gives us exactly a decade of data.
32Table 4.1: Low MD elasticity, BC calibration
Observation u 1972Q1 u 1982Q1 % change
unﬁltered data 5.8 8.8 41
unﬁltered model 5.8 6.3 08
low ﬁltered data 5.3 8.2 43
low ﬁltered model 5.8 6.1 05
high ﬁltered data 5.7 7.1 22
high ﬁltered model 5.8 6.0 03
Table 4.2: Low MD elasticity, BF calibration
Observation u 1972Q1 u 1982Q1 % change
unﬁltered data 5.8 8.8 41
unﬁltered model 5.4 12.6 80
low ﬁltered data 5.3 8.2 43
low ﬁltered model 5.8 8.4 37
high ﬁltered data 5.7 7.1 22
high ﬁltered model 6.1 7.1 15
Table 4.3: High MD elasticity, BC calibration
Observation u 1972Q1 u 1982Q1 % change
unﬁltered data 5.8 8.8 41
unﬁltered model 5.8 6.4 10
low ﬁltered data 5.3 8.2 43
low ﬁltered model 5.8 6.3 08
High ﬁltered data 5.7 7.1 22
High ﬁltered model 5.8 6.1 05
Table 4.4: High MD elasticity, BF calibration
Observation u 1972Q1 u 1982Q1 % change
unﬁltered data 5.8 8.8 41
unﬁltered model 5.8 12.5 73
low ﬁltered data 5.3 8.2 43
low ﬁltered model 5.8 8.4 37
high ﬁltered data 5.7 7.1 22
high ﬁltered model 6.1 7.0 14
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 report results of the same exercises using the BF cali-
bration. Now the model accounts for much of the movement in trend u using
am e d i u mﬁlter, and basically all of it using a high ﬁlter. And it is not as if
we ﬁltered out everything of interest: even with the high HP parameter u goes
33from below 5% to above 7% and back. Table 4.2 shows we can account for 68%
and 86% of the runup in low and high ﬁltered u during stagﬂation, although
at the cost of overpredicting somewhat the increase in unﬁltered u.O n e m a y
conclude from this that we can account for most of the low frequency behavior
of u. But the BF calibration method is extreme, in that its implied value of  
generates excess volatility in u wrt y shocks (obviously, since the BC calibration
generates just the right volatility wrt y shocks). In fact, u is about twice as
volatile wrt y shocks in the BF calibration. We nevertheless ﬁnd it interesting
that the theory can in principle account for as much as it does in this case.
Figures 6.5-6.8 report results with a more elastic money demand. The BC
version now generates a little more movement in u: as Table 4.3 indicates,
we can now account for 25, 19 or 23% of the runup in u during stagﬂation,
depending on which ﬁlter we use (compared to 20, 12 and 14% with a less
elastic money demand). Also, the BF version again does quite well, but now
with somewhat less excess volatility in u wrt real shocks. To describe the results
another way, with a low HP ﬁlter the scatter plot between i and u generated by
the model looks pretty similar to the data, and with a high ﬁlter the scatter plots
look indistinguishable (this was pretty much true with a lower money demand
elasticity, too). We conclude that the general message is similar with a more
elastic money demand, although with a bigger elasticity we can do a little more
in terms of accounting for the data.
To understand these results, consider the following intuitive argument. The
initial impact of a change in i is to reduce M/p,w h i c ha ﬀects revenue R and
ultimately employment. The size of the eﬀect of i on M/p and hence R is
determined by the money demand elasticity, as in any monetary model. The
size of the eﬀect of R on entry and hence u is then determined by the value
of leisure, as in the usual macro-labor model. Either a bigger money demand
elasticity or a bigger value of   generate similar net eﬀects. One way to see this is
34to consider the MP and LW curves drawn for the actual calibrated parameters
in Figure 7. More elastic money demand implies the LW curve shifts more
with i, while a higher value of   makes the MP curve ﬂatter, and both make u
respond more to monetary policy. Of course, shifting the curves only describes
comparisons across steady states, but this conveys the main economic insight.
We conclude that combinations of parameters that are not unreasonable
allow one to account for some and possibly a lot of the behavior in trend u -
just how much depending on the exact calibration. We have no problem with
t h ei d e at h a tp a r to ft r e n du should be explained by productivity, demographics,
taxes etc. We still think it is interesting that money in principle has a role to
play. One thing to do to make the results less dependent on   is to ask the
following: how big would a shock to i have to be to make it equivalent to a
given shock to y? The answer is shown in Figure 8. For a low money demand
elasticity, going from the Friedman rule i =0to i =0 .13 (i.e. 10% annual
inﬂation) is equivalent to a reduction in y of around 3/4 of 1%.F o r a h i g h e r
money demand elasticity, the answer is closed to 1.5%.
This suggests that money may be important for labor market performance
in the long run, independent of nominal rigidities, imperfect information, and
other channels that may or may not be relevant in the short run. And these
numbers are independent of the value of   or other aspects of the labor market.
Monetary policy, like productivity, has an impact on R, and Figure 8 simply
gives the equivalent eﬀect on R from either i or y. The degree that changes in R
translate into changes in u depends on how one calibrates the labor market, but
the comparison between changes in i and changes in y on R does not. Also, to be
clear, we are referring to changes in y holding other things constant, including b
and  . It is well known in the standard macro-labor model that the interesting
equilibrium variables are independent of changing productivity in market y and
nonmarket activities b and   at the same rate.
35Finally, we can also ask about the welfare cost of inﬂation. Some recent
models where money is modeled with relatively explicit microfoundations gen-
erate bigger costs than traditional models. The reduced-form literature typically
ﬁnds that eliminating 10% inﬂation is worth less than 1% of consumption, and
often much less, while models that explicitly incorporate frictions that make
money useful ﬁnd this same policy can be worth 3 to 4% or more.28 However,
these big eﬀects usually occur only when there are holdup problems, as occur in
bargaining models, and not in competitive search models like the one here. As
Figure 9 shows, we can generate big welfare eﬀects here even with competitive
search. One reason is that here inﬂation aﬀects unemployment u (and hence
trade on the extensive margin) as well as the quantity q (trade on the intensive
margin).
We do not dwell too much on welfare, however, since the results depend on
the assumption that the Hosios condition is satisﬁed in the labor market. We
can show the following. Given no constraints on policy, the optimum is to set
i =0and set ﬁscal policy (any combination of UI and a wage tax that can easily
be added to the model) to correct for discrepancies between bargaining power η
and the elasticity of the matching function σ in the labor market. Given ﬁscal
policy is set exogenously incorrectly, however, we would like to set i 6=0 .W e
of course are constrained to have i ≥ 0, but if e.g. UI is exogenously set too
low then the optimal monetary policy is i>0.I n t u i t i v e l y ,i fw eh a v ee x c e s s i v e
ﬁrm entry, we improve eﬃciency by the inﬂation tax. The main point however is
simply that the cost of inﬂation is sensitive, and can even be negative, depending
on bargaining power and ﬁscal policy. Additional exploration of welfare and
optimal policy is therefore left for future work.
28See e.g. Rocheteau and Wright (2007) or Craig and Rocheteau (2007) for summaries of
recent ﬁndings, as well as a discussion of more traditional studies.
366C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has studied a venerable issue in macroeconomics: the relation be-
tween unemployment and monetary variables like inﬂation or nominal inter-
est rates. We began by reviewing the data, and documenting a clear positive
long-run relationship between these variables after ﬁltering out higher-frequency
movements. We then built a model, based on explicit microfoundations for both
money and unemployment, consistent with these observations. The model takes
seriously Friedman’s (1977) suggestion that the natural rate of unemployment is
determined by real factors, including the cost of holding real balances. We think
the framework provides a natural integration and extension of existing models
of unemployment and monetary economics. We then considered some quanti-
tative issues, focusing on asking how the model accounts for the low-frequency
patterns in unemployment when the sole driving process is monetary policy.
The answer depends mainly on two key parameters: the elasticity of money
demand and value of leisure. The former inﬂuences the eﬀect of monetary
policy on real balances and hence on retail proﬁts, while the latter determines
how proﬁts translate to entry and employment. For conservative values of the
money demand elasticity and value of leisure, we can account for about 20%
of the increase in unemployment during the 1970s stagﬂation episode, which is
not insigniﬁcant but does leave room for other factors. For less conservative
but not unreasonable parameters, the model can account for the lion’s share
of movements in trend unemployment over the last half century. These results
suggest that monetary factors may be important for labor market outcomes,
not only theoretically but also quantitatively. Future research could attempt
to hone these numerical results and explore other quantitative and theoretical
questions in the general framework.
37Appendix
We deﬁne equilibrium in the dynamic-stochastic model for case of wage bar-
gaining in MP, price posting in KW, and price taking in AD (other combinations
are similar). At the start of a period the state is s =( u,i,y),w h e r eu is un-
employment, y productivity, and i nominal interest on bonds purchased in the
previous and redeemed in the current AD market. The state s was known in the
previous AD market, including the return on the nominal bonds maturing this
period. Although these bonds are not traded in equilibrium, i matters for the
following reason. When s+ is revealed in the current AD, there is a response
in the price p = p(s+) and hence in the return ρ(s+)=p(s)/p(s+) on money
brought in from the previous AD; this implies the no-arbitrage condition
1=β(1 + i)ˆ ρ(s),
where ˆ ρ(s)=Es+ [ρ(s+)|s].
We assume i and y follow exogenous and independent processes,
y+ = y + ρy(y − y)+ y,  y ∼ N(0,σy)
i+ = i + ρi(i − i)+ i,  i ∼ N(0,σi).
Unemployment changes endogenously as follows. The probability in MP an
unemployed h ﬁnds a job and f ﬁlls a vacancy are λh [τ(s)] and λf [τ(s)],w h e r e
τ(s) is the v/u ratio and v = v(s) w a ss e ti nt h ep r e v i o u sA Dm a r k e ta sa
function of the current state, so that
u+(s)=u − uλh [τ(s)] + (1 − u)δ.
Similarly, in KW the probability h meets a seller and f meets a buyer are
αh [Q(s)] and αf [Q(s)],w h e r et h eB/S ratio Q(s) and terms of trade [d(s),q(s)]
were posted in the previous AD market, and d is measured in units of x from
that market.
After MP and KW, in the current AD market the realization of s+ becomes
known. Firms then liquidate inventories, pay wages and dividends, create va-
cancies for the next MP, and post terms for the next KW. Also, households
choose real balances for the next KW, while government collects taxes, pays UI
and announces i+.O n c es+ is observed in AD, the real value of money brought
in from KW is adjusted from z(s) to z(s)ρ(s+); hence, in the KW market real
balances are valued at z(s)ˆ ρ(s). Also, agents can commit within the period to
any wage negotiated in MP, to be paid in units of x in the current AD market,
but w(s) can be renegotiated when MP reconvenes next period.
38We now present the value functions for h, keeping track of s as well as
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39w h e r ew en o t et h a tw vanishes from the RHS. Then [d(s),q(s),Q(s),Σ(s)] solve





Σ(s)=βαh [Q(s)]{υ [q(s)] − υ0 [q(s)]g[q(s), (s)]}
Σ(s) > 0= ⇒ Q =[ 1− u(s)]
−1 and Σ(s)=0= ⇒ Q = Q(i).
Finally, we construct a probability transition function P(s+,s) from the laws of
motion for u, i and y given above in the obvious way.
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where w and z both vanish on the RHS. Then the list (S,d,q,τ,Q,P) constitutes
an equilibrium as long as:
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(ii) the KW terms of trade solve
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−1 if u+(s) ≤ u(i)
[1 − u(i)]
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=0 ,a n dφ(u,i) is





,a si nt h et e x t .
(iv) MP tightness τ(s) solves
k = βλf [τ(s)]ηS(s)
(v) P( · ) is derived from the laws of motion.
It is a standard exercise to solve numerically for functions (S,d,q,τ,Q,P).
See http://www.wwz.unibas.ch/witheo/aleks/BMWII/BMWII.html for details,
including programs for calibration and simulation of the model.
40References
Acemoglu, Daron and Robert Shimer (1999) “Holdups and eﬃciency with
search frictions.” International Economic Review 40, 827—49.
Aiyagari, S. Rao and Neil Wallace (1991) “Existence of steady states with
positive consumption in the Kiyotaki-Wright model.” Review of Economic
Studies 58, 901-16.
Albrect, James, Pieter Gautier and Susan Vroman (2006) “Equilibrium Di-
rected Search with Multiple Applications.” Review of Economic Studies
73, 869-891
Aliprantis, C.D., Camera, G. and D. Puzzello (2007) “Anonymous Markets
and Monetary Trading.” Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 1905-28.
Andolfatto, David (1996) “Business Cycles and Labor-Market Search.” Amer-
ican Economic Review 86, 112-32.
Andolfatto, David, Scott Hendry and Kevin Moran (2004) “Labour markets,
liquidity, and monetary policy regimes.” Canadian Journal of Economics
37, 392-420.
Araujo, Luis (2004) “Social Norms and Money.” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics 51, 241-56.
Aruoba, S. Boragan, Guillaume Rocheteau and Christopher Waller (2007)
“Bargaining and the Value of Money.” Journal of Monetary Economics
54, 2636-55.
Aruoba, S. Boragan, Christopher Waller and Randall Wright (2006) “Money
and Capital.” Mimeo.
Berentsen, Aleksander, Gabriele Camera and Christopher Waller (2007) “Money,
Credit and Banking,” Journal of Economic Theory,f o r t h c o m i n g .
Beyer, Andreas and Roger E.A. Farmer (2007) “Natural Rate Doubts.” Journal
of Economic Dynamics & Control 31, 797-825.
Blanchard, Olivier and Jordi Gali (2005) “A New Keynesian Model with Un-
employment.” Mimeo,M I T .
Burdett, Kenneth, Shouyong Shi and Randall Wright (2001) “Pricing and
matching with frictions.” Journal of Political Economy 109, 1060-85.
Chiu, Jonathon and Cesar Meh (2006) “Banking, Liquidity and the Market for
Ideas.” Mimeo, Bank of Canada.
Cooley, Thomas F. and Gary D. Hansen (1989) “The Inﬂation Tax in a Real
Business Cycle Model.” American Economic Review 79, 733-48.
41Cooley, Thomas F. and Vincenzo Quadrini (2004) “Optimal Monetary Policy
in a Phillips Curve World.” Journal of Economic Theory 118, 174-208.
Corbae, Dean, Ted Temzelides and Randall Wright (2003) “Directed matching
and monetary exchange.” Econometrica 71, 731-56.
Craig Ben and Guillaume Rocheteau (2007) “Inﬂation and Welfare: A Search
Approach.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,f o r t h c o m i n g .
Diamond, Peter A. (1981) “Mobility Costs, Frictional Unemployment, and
Eﬃciency.” Journal of Political Economy 89, 798-812.
Diamond, Peter A. (1982) “Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equi-
librium.” Journal of Political Economy 90, 881-94.
Dong, Mei (2007) “The Phillips Curve in General Equilibrium with Competi-
tive Search.” Mimeo,S F U .
Faig, Miquel, and Xiuhua Huangfu (2005) “Competitive Search Equilibrium in
Monetary Economies.” Journal of Economic Theory,f o r t h c o m i n g .
Fang, Lei and Richard Rogerson (2006) “Policy Analysis in a Matching Model
With Intensive and Extensive Margins.” Mimeo,A r i z o n aS t a t e .
Farmer, Roger (2005) “Shooting the Auctioneer.” Mimeo,U C L A .
Friedman, Milton (1968) “The Role of Monetary Policy.” American Economic
Review 58.
Friedman, Milton (1977) “Inﬂation and Unemployment.” Journal of Political
Economy 85, 451-72.
Gertler, Mark and Antonella Trigari (2006) “Unemployment Fluctuations with
Staggered Nash Wage Bargaining.” Mimeo,N Y U .
Hagedorn, Marcus and Iourii Manovskii (2007) “The Cyclical Behavior of Un-
employment and Vacancies Revisited.” Mimeo.
Hall, Robert (2005) “Unemployment Fluctuations and Wage Stickiness.” Amer-
ican Economic Review 95, 50-65.
He, Ping, Lixin Huang and Randall Wright (2006) “Money, Banking and In-
ﬂation.” Mimeo, Penn.
Hosios, Arthur J. (1990) “On the Eﬃciency of Matching and Related Models
of Search and Unemployment.” Review of Economic Studies 57, 279-298.
Howitt, Peter (2005) “Beyond Search: Fiat Money in Organized Exchange.”
International Economic Review 46, 405-436.
Julien, Benoit, John Kennes and Ian King (2000) “Bidding for Labor.” Review
of Economic Dynamics 3, 619-49.
42Kircher, Philipp (2007) “Eﬃciency of Simultaneous Search.” Mimeo, Penn.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and Randall Wright. (1989) “On money as a medium of
exchange.” Journal of Political Economy 97, 927-954.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and Randall Wright (1993) “A search-theoretic approach
to monetary economics.” American Economic Review 83, 63-77.
Kocherlakota, Narayana (1998) “Money is memory.” Journal of Economic The-
ory 81, 232-251.
Kydland, Finn and Edward C. Prescott (1982) “Time to Build and Aggregate
Fluctuations.” Econometrica 50, 1345-70.
Lagos, Ricardo and Randall Wright (2005) “A uniﬁed framework for monetary
theory and policy analysis.” Journal of Political Economy 113, 463—488.
Lemann, Etienne (2006) “A Search Model of Unemployment and Inﬂation.”
Mimeo.
Lester, Benjamin, Andrew Postlewaite and Randall Wright (2007) “Informa-
tion and Liquidity.” Mimeo, Penn.
Li, Yiting (2007) “Currency and Checking Deposits as Means of Payment.”
Mimeo,N a t i o n a lT a i w a nU n i v e r s i t y .
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. (1973) “Some International Evidence on Output-Inﬂation
Tradeoﬀs.” American Economic Review 63, 326-34.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. (1980) “Two Illustrations of the Quantity Theory of
Money.” American Economic Review 1970, 1005-14.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. (2000) “Inﬂation and Welfare.” Econometrica 68, 247-
274.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. and Edward C. Prescott (1974). “Equilibrium search
and unemployment.” Journal of Economic Theory 7, 188-209.
Matsuyama, Kiminori, Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and Akihiro Matsui (1993) “To-
wards a Theory of International Currency.” Review of Economic Studies
60, 283-307.
Menzio, Guido (2007). “A Theory of Partially Directed Search.” Journal of
Political Economy 115, 748-69.
Menzio, Guido and Shouyong Shi (2008) “Eﬃcient Search on the Job and the
Business Cycle.” University of Toronto Working Paper 308.
Merz, Monika (1995) “Search in the Labor Market and the Real Business
Cycle.” Journal of Monetary Economics 36, 269-300.
43Moen, Espen R. (1997) “Competitive search equilibrium.” Journal of Political
Economy 105, 385-411.
Molico, Miguel (2006) “The distribution of money and prices in search equi-
librium.” International Economic Review 47, 701-22.
Mortensen, Dale T. (1982) “Property Rights and Eﬃciency in Mating, Racing,
and Related Games,” American Economic Review 72, 968-79.
Mortensen, Dale T. and Eva Nagypal (2007) “More on Unemployment and
Vacancy Fluctuations.” Review of Economic Dynamics 10, 327-47.
Mortensen, Dale T. and Christopher Pissarides (1994) “Job Creation and Job
D e s t r u c t i o ni nt h eT h e o r yo fU n e m p l o y m e n t . ”Review of Economic Studies
61, 397-416.
Mortensen, Dale T. and Randall Wright (2002) “Competitive pricing and eﬃ-
ciency in search equilibrium.” International Economic Review 43, 1-20.
Phelan, Christopher (2005) “Discussion [of Huberto Ennis].” Philadelphia Con-
ference on Macro and Monetary Economics, 2005.
Phelps, Edmund S. (1969) “Introduction” to Microeconomic Foundations of
Employment and Inﬂation Theory.N e wY o r k :N o r t o n .
Pissarides, Christopher (1985) “Short-Run Equilibrium Dynamics of Unem-
ployment, Vacancies and Real Wages.” American Economic Review 75,
676-90.
Pissarides, Christopher (2000) Equilibrium unemployment theory, 2nd edition.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Rocheteau, Guillaume, Peter Rupert and Randall Wright (2006) “The Phillips
Curve in General Equilibrium.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics,f o r t h -
coming.
Rocheteau, Guillaume and Randall Wright (2005) “Money in Competitive
Equilibrium, in Search Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilib-
rium.” Econometrica 73 (2005), 175-202.
Rocheteau, Guillaume and Randall Wright (2007) “Inﬂation and Welfare in
Models with Trading Frictions.” In Monetary Policy in Low Inﬂation Eco-
nomics,e d .E dN o s a l&D a v i dA l t i g ,C a m b r i d g e ,f o r t h c o m i n g .
Rogerson, Richard (1988) “Indivisible Labor, Lotteries and Equilibrium.” Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics 21, 3-16.
Rogerson, Richard, Lodewijk P. Vischers and Randall Wright (2008) “Labor
Market Fluctuations in the Small and in the Large.” International Journal
of Economic Theory,f o r t h c o m i n g .
44Shi, Shouyong (1995) “Money and prices: A model of search and bargaining.”
Journal of Economic Theory 67, 467-496.
Shi, Shouyong (1997) “A divisible search model of ﬁat money.” Econometrica
65, 75-102.
Shi, Shouyong (1998) “Search for a Monetary Propagation Mechanism.” Jour-
nal of Economic Theory 81, 314-352.
Shi, Shouyong (1999) “Search, Inﬂation, and Capital Accumulation.” Journal
of Monetary Economics 44, 81-103.
Shi, Shouyong and Weimin Wang (2006) “The Variability of the Velocity of
Money in a Search Model.” Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 537-71.
Shimer, Robert (1996) “Contracts in frictional labor market.” Mimeo, Prince-
ton University.
Shimer, Robert (2005) “The Cyclical Behavior of Unemployment and Vacan-
cies.” American Economic Review 95, 25-49.
Trejos, Alberto and Randall Wright (1995) “Search, Bargaining, Money, and
Prices.” Journal of Political Economy 103, 118-141.
Williamson, Steve (2006) “Search, Limited Participation, and Monetary Pol-
icy.” International Economic Review 47, 107-128.
Wallace, Neil (2001) “Whither Monetary Economics?” International Economic
Review 42, 847-869.
Wright, Randall (2007) “A Proof of Uniqueness of Monetary Steady State.”
Mimeo,P e n n .




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.14: Interest rate and M0/PY 
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log(M1/PY) = a + b*log(i)
i = a + b*M1/PY









Figure 5.1: M1/PY elasticities
log(M1/PY) = a + b*log(i)
log(M1/PY) = a + b*i
M1/PY = a + b*i
Each point (x, y) displays the interest elasticity
of money demand y calculated with data from 1948-x.Figure 6.1: BC low elasticity 160000


































2000-2005Figure 6.2: BC low elasticity 1600


































2000-2005Figure 6.3: BF low elasticity 160000


































2000-2005Figure 6.4: BF low elasticity 1600


































2000-2005Figure 6.5: BC high elasticity 160000


































2000-2005Figure 6.6: BC high elasticity 1600


































2000-2005Figure 6.7: BF high elasticity 160000


































2000-2005Figure 6.8: BF high elasticity 1600


































2000-2005Figure 7: LW and MP curves
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